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Abstract
The surgical robot experienced rapid uptake throughout hospitals in the US despite lack of
clinical evidence that it is superior to existing methods and undeterred by its high cost. This type
of technology may be a “weapon” in the medical arms race hypothesis which asserts that
competition among hospitals may be welfare reducing wherein it encourages resource use that is
not commensurate with beneficial health outcomes. This paper is a case-study of the diffusion of
the surgical robot among hospitals in Florida. We address the medical arms race hypothesis
directly by investigating whether a hospital’s decision to adopt a robot is a function of the
neighboring, competing hospitals’ decisions to do so. Using a spatial autoregressive probit
model, we find that the spatial coefficient is significant and negative. That is, when neighboring
hospitals operate a robot, a given hospital is less likely to operate one. Indeed, hospitals appear to
consider the behavior of rival hospitals, but not in a way that would be consistent with a medical
arms race. Support is lent to the hypothesis that as more hospitals become providers of roboticassisted surgery (RAS), the less profitable it becomes to enter the market.
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1. Introduction
A primary driving force behind the extensive growth in healthcare spending in the US, the largest
per-capita healthcare spender, is attributed to the use of medical technology in hospital services
(Newhouse, 1992; Smith, Newhouse, & Freeland, 2009; Chandra, Holmes, & Skinner, 2013).
This dissertation seeks to investigate the nature of competition on the adoption of medical
technology by hospitals. More specifically, this is a case-study of the adoption of the surgical
robot among hospitals in Florida. Since its FDA approval in 2000, the surgical robot has
experienced rapid uptake across hospitals. The propensity toward the adoption of the surgical
robot despite lack of clinical evidence that it is superior to existing methods together with its
high cost has implicated the technology as a “weapon” in a medical arms race. The medical arms
race hypothesis asserts that technology-based competition among hospitals may lead to excessive
provision of medical technology or amenities.1
It has been suggested that there are two distinct forms of the medical arms race. Barros et al.
(1999) propose it could be one of lack of coordination across providers. Under certain conditions
relating to how strongly demand responds to technology and the costs associated with adoption,
this may result in an overinvestment in medical technology. Another possible form of a medical
arms race concerns signaling. Hospitals might invest in the latest technology to signal their
quality to both potential patients and medical personnel (Barros & Martinez-Giraltb, 2013). This

“Excessive” meaning sub-optimal or welfare reducing: the resource use is not commensurate with
beneficial health outcomes, that is, at the “flat of the curve” in medicine; this would apply when a
technology is overutilized or when less cost-effective technology is adopted).
1

6

real or perceived quality signal is useful to attract market volume (and physicians), as it is likely
an important factor for patients (and physicians) when choosing among hospitals. If this largely
explains the medical technology adoption phenomena, we expect that in most cases competition
will increase robot adoption.
However, other phenomenon may occur in strategic interaction in which either no hospitals
choose to adopt or some hospitals adopt the technology while others choose not to. The former
case may arise if adoption costs are prohibitively high. In the latter case, for example, depending
on the relative costs of adoption, those facing higher costs may choose not to adopt while for
those facing lower costs, the technology may be adopted.2 Alternatively, it has been noted that
competition may have a limiting effect on technology adoption (Reinganum, 1981). Depending
on how sensitive are patients to the presence of technology, as more hospitals adopt a technology
the remaining market share diminishes. This results in smaller profit-margins from adopting the
technology as time goes on. Thus, as hospitals learn of neighboring hospitals’ decision to adopt
the technology, i.e. the “first movers”, this reduces the incentive for the neighboring hospitals to
invest.
Whether support is lent to the medical arms race hypothesis or whether another phenomenon
occurs is of empirical interest since understanding the behavior of hospitals interacting
strategically informs healthcare policymakers and stakeholders. It is also in the interest of public
health since technology can be beneficial but also comes with costs. Using a spatial
autoregressive probit model, we address the effect of competition directly by investigating the
nature of a hospital’s decision to adopt a robot as a function of the neighboring, competing

2

Costs may be related to unobservable characteristics of the hospital and/or physician quality which we
cannot control for in this analysis.
7

hospitals’ decision. A significant and positive spatial coefficient supports a medical arms race
whereas a significant and negative spatial coefficient lends support to the market’s limiting
effect. An insignificant result indicates there is no underlying spatial relationship in the diffusion
of the robot. This may suggest the technology diffusion is not driven by the behavior of rival
hospitals or that it may be driven by some quality-cost differences unobservable to the
researchers. We find that the spatial coefficient is significant and negative. That is, when
neighboring hospitals operate a robot, a given hospital is less likely to operate one. Indeed,
hospitals appear to consider the behavior of rival hospitals, but not in a way that would be
consistent with a medical arms race. Support is lent to the hypothesis that as more hospitals
become providers of robotic-assisted surgery (RAS), the less profitable it becomes to enter the
market.

The dissertation is organized as follows: in section 2 we provide motivation and relevant
background information related to the US healthcare market, the surgical robot, diffusion of
technology in the hospital market and a review of the literature; in 3 we suggest a conceptual
framework which motivates the empirical model; in section 4 we cover the econometric model,
estimation strategy and data; in 5 we discuss results and robustness checks; and in section 6 we
conclude.
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2. Background
2.1. US healthcare system
Several distinguishing and interrelated aspects of US healthcare system facilitate or determine
technology adoption: the presence of health insurance, uncertainty about efficacy of care and
market structure.
2.1.1. Health insurance
One of the features of the US healthcare market is the presence of insurance and its
reimbursement mechanisms. Since patients with health insurance are generally only expected to
pay some portion of the total cost of medical care, out-of-pocket expenses are relatively low
which may lead to price insensitivity when deciding how much healthcare to consume.
Depending on the reimbursement mechanism, healthcare providers may also be insensitive to
costs. This was particularly concerning when payments were made retrospectively, i.e. ex post,
based on services rendered. Neither patients or hospitals had cost considerations that might limit
the adoption or use of medical technology (or consumption of healthcare, more generally). In
fact, even from an innovation perspective, it has been shown that insurance may increase the
entry of (cost-increasing) medical technologies (Goddeeris 1984).
This overinvestment was potentially curbed in the early 1980s with some structural
changes to the healthcare market. With the introduction of Medicare’s Prospective Payment
System (PPS), payments were no longer tied to actual costs but rather to a pre-determined
amount according to the classification of the visit, i.e. diagnosis-related group (DRG). Since a
hospital can retain the difference between the DRG payment and actual costs, this structure
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provides the incentive for hospitals to become more cost-conscious in their care decisions.
Around the same time, managed care in US private healthcare insurance took roots with its
various strategies aimed to cull costs. For example, in network-based managed care
organizations, hospitals compete for selective contracting with insurance companies to have
access to their network of patients. This competition puts downward pressure on hospitals’ costs.
In the mid-1990s, prompted by patients’ complaints about lack of options and with the growth of
consolidated hospital systems, health insurance companies lost some of their power against
hospitals. These conditions, which describe the current healthcare environment, make it
relatively more favorable for overinvestment in medical technology.
2.1.2. Efficacy of care
Many medical technologies have significantly enhanced the quality of our healthcare, improving
diagnostics, minimizing invasiveness, abbreviating hospital duration, and in some cases,
reducing costs. However, not all technologies perform the same, and in efforts to contain the
rising cost of health care in the US, much attention has been drawn to identify high-cost, lowvalue technologies. Skinner et al. recognize a heterogeneity across medical technologies in terms
of their productivity and find that, on a macroeconomic level, countries more likely to adopt low
productivity technologies, particularly what they refer to as “category II & III” technologies, are
also more likely to experience the most rapid growth in health care costs. Category II includes
those medical technologies having less consistent health outcomes, being beneficial to some
while not providing value to others, but are prone to overuse and thus caution should be applied
(e.g. MRI and CT scans); category III are the medical technologies which are associated with
incremental health benefits and may be very expensive, offering little to no value (2011). The
relative scarceness of randomized clinical trials (RCT) compared to population-based,
retrospective studies in the medical literature (due to the cost and ethical considerations
10

necessary for RCT) makes it difficult to distinguish the efficacy of medical technologies. Thus,
especially in the presence of health insurance, excessive adoption can occur.
Despite sometimes limited or conflicting information about efficacy of particular medical
technologies, there are societal beliefs about the curative nature of medical technology.
Marketing research finds that patient-consumers associate new and expensive technology with
effectiveness (Korobkin, 2013); that limited use of such technology is perceived as a cost-saving
decision, even when there is lack of evidence of the technology clinically surpassing traditional
methods (Schleifer & Rothman, 2012); and that advertising is directed at patients (Brennan,
2006). Indeed, the makers of the surgical robot have taken a direct-to-consumer advertising
approach, sometimes leading patients to demand RAS. Moreover, marketing for robotic
procedures typically relies on the same positive aspects of traditional MIS, making it misleading.
2.1.3. Hospital market
While the above-mentioned market characteristics facilitate investment in medical technology,
the focus of this dissertation is on the role of the market in particular. The hospital market
structure in the US tends toward an oligopoly with strategic interaction occurring among
hospitals as they aim to maximize profits. We expect that even non-profit hospitals behave
similarly, which is standard in the literature. This was put forth by Newhouse (1970) in his
theory of output maximization and empirically corroborated by Horwitz and Nichol (2007). They
found that in the presence of for-profit hospitals, non-profit hospitals will aim to maximize
profits, since the for-profit hospitals “cream skim” patients, leaving the non-profit hospitals with
a patient mix that tends to lose money for the hospital. Survival requires a non-profit to act in
profit-maximizing ways.
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Strategic interaction is a defining characteristic of the oligopolistic market structure that
the US hospital market most closely parallels. The existence of health insurance and the resulting
insensitivity of most patients to price leads to the presence of non-price competition among
hospitals as they compete to obtain greater market share. Higher market share leads to higher
utilization rates, economies of scale and improved learning curves.
2.1.3.1. Medical arms race

Under certain conditions, the strategic interaction between hospitals may lead them to overinvest
in medical technology. As presented by Barros et al. (1999), the medical arms race can be
summarized in the following game. Suppose the cost of adoption of a particular technology
differs across hospitals where the cost for hospital B exceeds the cost for hospital A, i.e. 𝐶 > 𝑐.
Further assume that there are N patients paying price p for the hospital visit. Patients are taken to
be highly responsive to the presence of technology such that if the technology is present in both
hospitals, the patients will be split evenly across the two hospitals whereas if one hospital has the
technology and the other is a non-adopter, all patients will go to the hospital with technology.
The hospitals’ payoff matrix will be the following:
Table 1. Hospital payoff matrix
Hospital B

Hospital A

Adopt technology

No technology

Adopt technology

Np/2-c, Np/2-C

Np-c, 0

No technology

0, Np-C

Np/2, Np/2

A variety of outcomes may arise depending on the relationship between costs and expected
patient-volume revenue. Assuming adoption costs are low so that c < C < Np/2, a prisoner’s
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dilemma emerges. The optimal outcome is for neither hospital to adopt the technology, but due
to lack of coordination between hospitals, both providers will invest in the technology, i.e. a
medical arms race. The results rely on the underlying assumptions about the sensitivity of
patients to the presence of technology: the first-mover obtains the market share. As mentioned
above, patients do appear to be highly sensitive to medical technology. In a related continuoustime game framework put forth by Fudenberg & Tirole (1985), it has been shown that in a
duopoly, rents are equilized in the presence of threats of preemption; however, in a broader
oligopoly, the advantage of preemption is sufficiently small so that late adoption can occur in a
symmetric equilibrium . The MAR has also been presented purely as a signaling theory (Barros
et al., 1999). If the hospitals are using the technology to signal their underlying and unobserved
quality, under certain conditions related to their true quality and costs of adoption, the perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibrium may be that overinvestment occurs.
2.1.3.2. Other outcomes

However, other outcomes may arise. Maintaining the assumption of highly sensitive demand in
the simultaneous game representation (i.e. coordination), if costs of adopting are sufficiently
high, C > c > Np/2, the dominant strategy is for both hospitals not to adopt. On the other hand, if
adoption costs are distinct across hospitals so that C > Np/2 > c, the interaction would result in
the hospital facing higher costs, B, choosing not to adopt the technology while for the hospital A
with lower costs, the technology will be adopted. A similar equilibrium may arise from signaling
under certain conditions related to costs of adoption that distinguish high and low-quality
doctors/hospitals. For example, high-quality doctors may have a shorter learning curve. In these
cases, the market may function to counteract excessive adoption of medical technology. From a
more dynamic perspective, there are several theoretical models that explain a process of
technology diffusion in which an agent’s own payoffs and the payoffs of other agents in the
13

network are known. As true payoffs are revealed, an efficient equilibrium will emerge (Bala &
Goyal, 1998). Along the same line, Reinganum’s (1981) model suggests that, at first,
competition increases the diffusion of a technology as first-movers attempt to gain competitive
advantage. However, the market share will decrease as more firms adopt the technology, thereby
reducing the incentive to adopt the technology. Each of these results in a strategic interaction in
which some hospitals adopt the technology (i.e., the true “high quality” or the “first-movers”),
while others choose not to.
2.2.
Surgical robot
Minimally invasive surgery (MIS), also referred to as laparoscopic surgery, can be performed
through “keyhole” incisions and is associated with significant improvements over the
comparable surgery performed traditionally, that is, open surgery. Advantages of MIS over
traditional/open surgery include lessened complications and blood loss, reduced recovery times,
shorter hospital duration and lessened post-operative pain and scaring rendering it a major leap
forward in surgery. In 2000, the FDA approved the only surgical “robot” capable of performing
MIS, Intuitive Surgical’s da Vinci Surgical System, which is now used in adult and pediatric
MIS/laparoscopic surgeries including general, cardiac, colorectal, gynecological, head and neck,
thoracic and urologic. A breakdown of the primary procedure codes associated with the robotic
surgeries performed at hospitals with the surgical robot in our sample. Approximately half of the
RAS-performed procedures were prostatectomy and hysterectomy.
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Figure 1. Primary procedures for which RAS was performed, all hospitals

The machine, which requires a dedicated operating room and costs approximately $2 million,
allows a specially-trained surgeon to indirectly control surgical instruments attached to robotic
arms suspended above the patient by way of a remote computer-control. The instruments are
receptive to feedback allowing for smoother, tremor-free motions from the surgeon and greater
range of motion. Although the overall surgery time generally exceeds that of traditional
minimally-invasive methods, from the console the surgeons have better visualization via a
magnified high-definition 3-D viewfinder and they can move more freely which may lead to
better health outcomes when compared to traditional laparoscopic surgery.
As an iteration of MIS, RAS sometimes has clear advantages over traditional, open
surgery. However, the clinical benefits of robotic-MIS over traditional MIS have not yet been
clearly substantiated with the current population-based studies indicating minimal or no clinical
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advantages despite higher costs. Thus far, there has been a lack of randomized controlled trials
assessing the traditional/open/conventional, conventional-laparoscopic/minimally invasive, and
robotic-assisted laparoscopic approaches. The reliance on retrospective studies comparing these
methods makes generalization difficult due to the inability to control for potentially important
confounding factors such as surgeon training and ability.
There have been notable meta-analyses comparing these approaches in radical
prostatectomy and gynecological/hysterectomy procedures with mixed conclusions. The
population-based meta-analysis comparing traditional, conventional-laparoscopic and roboticlaparoscopic approaches to radical prostatectomy concludes that robotic prostatectomy
performed at least as well as traditional or traditional-laparoscopic approaches based on primary
outcomes (reduced blood loss, lower morbidity, positive surgical margins and safety) and
secondary outcomes (transfusion rates, hospital length of stay and individual complication rates).
The authors acknowledge that the large size of the study may lead to statistical significance
without clinical significance. Further, no assessment of the costs was considered (Tewari et al.,
2012).
Another large, population-based study compares RAS use in hysterectomy relative to
conventional laparoscopic hysterectomy. The study, which makes use of propensity score
matching, suggests robotic-MIS and traditional MIS perform similarly on measures of
complication. Specifically, robotically-assisted hysterectomy slightly decreased the probability
of hospital stay longer than two days but was associated with no difference in the need for
transfusion or discharge to a nursing facility. Despite the similar outcomes, the RAS had an
associated cost premium of $2,189. Yet, hysterectomies performed robotically, which were
FDA-approved starting in 2005, have increased from 0.5 percent in 2007 to 9.5 percent in 2010
16

(Wright et al. 2013). Indeed, according to a systematic review of the literature on surgical
treatments for gynecologic indications, there is no clear evidence to conclude RAS or traditional
MIS provides superior outcomes (Gala et al., 2014). As of March 2015, the Committee on
Gynecological Practice, Society of Gynecologic Surgeons, had the following opinion on RAS in
the field:
“Adoption of new surgical techniques should be driven by what is best for the
patient, as determined by evidence-based medicine rather than external pressures. Welldesigned randomized controlled trials or comparably rigorous nonrandomized
prospective trials are needed to determine which patients are likely to benefit from robotassisted surgery and to establish the potential risks.”
While one such randomized controlled trial exists in the field of urology, it compares the clinical
benefits of the RAS procedure to the procedure performed traditionally rather than conventional
laparoscopically. The first stage of a randomized controlled trial comparing robotically-assisted
prostatectomies (the most common use of the surgical robot) with traditional/open surgery
localized prostate cancer treatment found similar outcomes at 12 weeks in terms of urinary and
sexual function, post-operative complications and days missed from work. As would be
expected, the prostatectomies performed via the robotic MIS were associated with less blood loss
and less post-operative pain compared to the open surgery, but at 12 weeks, these differences
leveled out. A second phase with long-term results is forthcoming (Yaxley et al., 2016).
Robotic-assisted MIS presents its own disadvantages including longer surgery times and
mid and post-operative complications, some linked to deaths. In addition to the high fixed costs
associated with the adoption of the surgical robot, high variable costs include an annual
maintenance service contract with Intuitive costing $100,000-$170,000 and per-use disposables
17

which increase the per-procedure cost $1,200-$2,000 relative to an equivalent MIS procedure. If
hospital duration is reduced by RAS, then some of the variable cost can be offset.
Despite the large costs associated with this technology, hospitals are reimbursed the same
regardless of the MIS method used, and thus the extensive costs mentioned provide an incentive
for a recuperation of costs on the part of the hospital.3 One way in which these higher costs are
passed on in this reimbursement structure is by increasing the charges for the procedures or
diagnoses for which surgical robots can be utilized either to account for the inability of some
patients to fulfil their payments, particularly the uninsured, and/or to account for the replacement
and updating of technology. Because Medicare and private-insurer reimbursement rates are
determined by these procedure and diagnosis charges, the added costs related to the surgical
robot are indirect (Barbash & Glied, 2010). High marginal costs may be offset through
economies of scale as higher volume allows surgeons to become more proficient. It has been
estimated that in order to offset the fixed and variable expense associated with the acquisition of
the surgical robot through economies of scale, hospitals must perform 150-300 procedures each
year for six years (Lee, 2014). Thus, the incentive exists to perform surgery with the technology
rather than without, even if it is not clinically optimal for the patient, an occurrence known as
“treatment creep”. Eventually hospitals are assumed to earn profit from RAS, so increasing
patient volume and/or performing a surgery that otherwise would not have occurred can return
profits sooner.

The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) designates certain rural hospitals as “Critical
Access Hospitals” (CMAs) and, as a function of Medicare beneficiaries at the hospital, these hospitals are
eligible for varying subsidized capital expenditures including the da Vinci Surgical System. At the time of
the analysis, 13 hospitals in Florida have been given this designation: Calhoun – Liberty Hospital,
Campbellton-Graceville, Doctor’s Memorial – Bonifay, Fishermen’s, Florida Hospital Wauchula, George
E. Weems, Hendry RMC, Lake Butler, Madison County Memorial and Mariners.
3
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Figure 1 summarizes, for all relevant hospitals in Florida, the historical ratio of hospitals
with the surgical robot to those without from 2008 to 2013. The figure reveals that the surgical
robot has steadily increased in number and as a percentage of all hospital ownership, with 21
percent of hospitals having acquired a surgical robot in 2008 to over half having obtained one by
the year 2013. In Florida, a certificate of need is not required for the purchase of the surgical
robot.

Figure 2. Adoption of the surgical robot; all long-term, acute care hospitals in Florida

From a geographical perspective, the spatial distribution of the hospitals in Florida that
have acquired the surgical robot in 2008 and 2013 are displayed for comparison in Figure 2 and
Figure 3. We seek to determine whether there is a spatial element to the presence of the surgical
robot in hospitals across Florida. See Appendix B for further exploratory spatial analysis.
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Figure 3. Spatial distribution of surgical robots in 2008

Figure 4. Spatial distribution of surgical robots in 2013
20

2.3. Literature review
Due to the impact of insurance on the behavior of healthcare providers, the literature can be
segmented into “pre-managed care” and “post-managed care” sets and a more recent set of
literature which encompasses the increase in hospital negotiating power as they consolidate into
systems. The general consensus in the pre-managed care literature is that competition in the
healthcare market leads to increased costs. That is, hospitals in less concentrated markets have
higher costs per patient (Robinson & Luft, 1985; Noether, 1988), a higher employee/patient ratio
(Robinson, 1988), and more high-tech services (Luft et al., 1986). Generally, the conclusion
reverses, however, after the growth of managed care. Melnick & Zwanziger confirm the negative
relationship between costs and concentration prior to the growth of managed care organizations
and identify a loss of correlation post-PPO (1988). In another study, Zwanziger & Melnick find
that after selective contracting, the rate of cost growth is smaller in less concentrated markets
(1988). Taking advantage of the rollout of Medicare PPO in California, Dranove, Shanley, &
Simon discover no relationship prior to managed care, but that post-managed care, more
competition lead to a reduction in cost/price-margins (1992). Kessler & McClellan (1999) use a
three-stage model in which a predicted measure of a hospital’s patients are chosen based on a
patient-level hospital choice model determined by such factors as demographics and distance
from the patient’s residence. Hospital market competitiveness is based on these predicted patient
flows rather than the actual patient flows which breaks the endogeneity inherent in hospital
selection and measures of HHI. Using this approach, they find that in the presence of managed
care, competition reduced costs and adverse health outcomes.
Narrowing down the literature to technology adoption, in particular, many studies
confirm a medical arms race hypothesis. James models the relative-size-weighted (that is, the
number of hospital beds as a fraction of total hospital beds in the county) number of hospitals in
21

a county that offer specific high-tech services as a function of the hospital demand and cost shift
factors and a measure of competition. Her measure of weighting, she argues, emphasizes the
ability of patients to have access to the treatment, and this distinction corresponds to the
overprovision of a service causing an “unnecessary degree of access rather than a greater number
of providers” (2002). Ladapo et al. study computed tomography, a type of imaging technology
(2009). While controlling for clinical need and other hospital characteristics such as the
operating margins, insurance reimbursement rates, whether related services were offered, and in
particular a proxy for being a “first mover” / “technological leader” (i.e. adoption of PET), this
article determines that early adoption is influenced by cardiac patient volume and hospital
operating margins, but not by market competitiveness or insurance reimbursement. To assess the
level of competitiveness in each hospital’s market, a Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) is
constructed by summing the square of the hospital’s admissions relative to the Hospital Referral
Region/markets’ admissions. Sethi (2014) finds that the adoption of endovascular aneurism
repair adoption is associated with market forces – patients at more competitive hospitals are at
increased odds of undergoing EVAR. He makes use of the Nationwide Inpatient Sample from
the American Hospital Association annual survey, linked with Hospital Market Structure data for
estimating HHI in a variable geographic radius defined by its encompass of 90 percent of
discharged patients.
Studies with particular application to the adoption of surgical robots are more limited.
Most recently, a patient-level study on the influence of market forces and hospital financial
status (as measured by the operating margin) on the usage of surgical robots for certain
procedures finds evidence that increased market competition (as measured by HHI) is correlated
with increased usage. However, conditioned on having acquired a surgical robot, only one
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procedure type (partial nephrectomy) was (positively) associated with the hospital’s operating
margins. Wright et al. finds a positive correlation between more competitive regional markets
(HHI-based) and an increased probability of patients receiving a RAS; however, they find also
that once a hospital obtains the surgical robot, it is no more or less likely to provide RAS as a
function of the competition (2016). Barbash, et al. (2014) study the determinants of robot
adoption and conclude that factors associated with the adoption of a surgical robot include:
increased proportion of other hospitals within the set geographic market area having already
acquired a robot, hospitals with more than 300 beds, and teaching hospitals.
In Li et al. (2014), the researchers model a hospital’s decision to acquire a surgical robot
as a function of the nearest neighbor’s previous decision to do so, teaching status, surgical
volume, number of beds and urban setting. Using inpatient data from seven states between the
years of 2001 and 2005, along with data from the robot manufacturer, Li et al. (2014) model this
as a temporal and spatial decision using a two-state Markov chain method. They find evidence
in support of the medical arms race which is to say that if the nearest neighboring hospital
previously acquired a robot, a hospital was more likely to acquire one as well (OR 1.71, p=0.02).
While the current study is similar in Li et al.’s direct approach in answering the medical arms
race, their analysis is limited by assuming influence exists only from the nearest neighbors. The
current study makes no such restriction and allows for a more comprehensive influence from
nearby hospitals (subject to the assumptions made by the spatial weights matrix selection) as
described in the empirical section. Additionally, as explained below, it may not be necessary to
model the decision temporally since, under weak assumptions the simultaneous equilibrium
outcome is encompassing.
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3. Conceptual framework
We borrow the theoretical and empirical framework suggested by Mobley (2003) and used by
Mobley, Frech, & Anselin (2009) and Gravelle, Santos, & Siciliani (2014) to ask whether
provision of robotic surgery is a strategic complement, i.e. whether each hospital responds to
rival hospitals' provision of robotic surgery with its own provision of that service. The hospital
market is characterized as an oligopoly in which the equilibrium provision of robotic surgery is
determined in simultaneous profit-maximizing decisions where each hospital’s reaction function
depends on the expected decision of nearby hospitals.
Empirically, this question can be answered using a spatial model in which the effect of
neighboring hospitals' decisions to operate using robots depends on spatial proximity, i.e. the
spatial autoregressive model. The spatial lag parameter (described later) is interpreted as the
slope of the reaction function. Mobley (2003) and Mobley et al. (2009) apply this theoretical
motivation for the corresponding empirical model to examine the effect of competition on price
while Gravelle, Santos, & Siciliani (2014) do so for the effect of competition on quality.
The adapted theoretical model is as follows. The demand function of hospital i can be
defined as 𝑋𝑖 = 𝑋(𝑦𝑖 , 𝒚−𝒊 ; 𝛿𝑖 ), where 𝑦𝑖 is the operation of robotic machines of hospital i, 𝒚−𝒊 is
the corresponding decision of neighboring rival hospitals, and 𝛿𝑖 are hospital demand
parameters. We assume that hospitals receive a per-treatment price, p. Hospital cost parameters
are denoted 𝛾𝑖 . The objective function of hospital i is to choose 𝑦𝑖 to maximize
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑝𝑋𝑖 (𝑦𝑖 , 𝑦−𝑖 ; 𝛿𝑖 ) − 𝐶𝑖 (𝑋𝑖 (𝑦𝑖 , 𝑦−𝑖 ), 𝑦𝑖 ; 𝛾𝑖 ) − 𝐹𝑖
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Assuming hospitals simultaneously choose robotic surgery provision, then maximizing the
objective function above with respect to 𝑦𝑖 , we obtain the first order condition for the Nash
equilibrium
𝜕𝜋𝑖 ∗ ∗
(𝑦 , 𝑦 ) = 0
𝜕𝑦𝑖 𝑖 −𝑖

(1)

Further assuming the hospital objective function is strictly concave in its choice variable i.e.,
𝜕 2 𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑦𝑖2

∗
(𝑦𝑖∗ , 𝑦−𝑖
)<0

∗
). The system of two equations with two unknowns given
we have the Nash equilibrium: (𝑦𝑖∗ , 𝑦−𝑖

in equation (1) can be solved for 𝑦𝑖 to give the reaction function for hospital i
𝑦𝑖𝑅 = 𝑦𝑖𝑅 (𝑦−𝑖 ; 𝛿𝑖 , 𝛾𝑖 )
We are interested in the effect of rivals' robotic surgery provision decisions on hospital i's robotic
surgery provision. By the implicit function theorem, we obtain the slope of the reaction function
for hospital i,

𝜕𝑦𝑖𝑅
𝜕𝑦−𝑖

𝜕 2 𝜋𝑖⁄
𝜕𝑦𝑖 𝑦−𝑖
=
2
𝜕 𝜋𝑖
−
⁄𝑦 2
𝑖

Where, given our second-order assumption, the sign of the cross-partial derivative determines
whether robotic surgery provision is a strategic complement (positive), strategic substitute
(negative), or independent. The cross-partial derivative represents the derivative of the hospital’s
marginal profit with respect to the rivals’ choice.
The decision to adopt a surgical robot may not in fact be simultaneous, but rather
conditioned on nearby decisions made in previous years. As noted in LeSage and Pace (2009)
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and LeSage et al. (2011), the simultaneous spatial autoregressive model can be interpreted as the
steady state equilibrium for the dynamic process.4 In other words, cross-sectional spatial
dependence can capture the diffusion of the surgical robot over time; therefore, we have modeled
the decision as a simultaneous one.

4

As outlined in (Pace & LeSage, 2010; J. P. LeSage et al., 2011), we can begin by examining a dynamic
spatial model omitting any simultaneous element and then showing that, under certain conditions, the
model converges to the simultaneous version. Starting with spatiotemporal model that relies only on past
data and omits any simultaneous spatial interaction, we have
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐺𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀𝑡 ,

𝜀𝑡 ~𝑁(0𝑛 , 𝜎 2 𝐼𝑛 )

𝐺 = 𝜏𝐼𝑛 + 𝜌𝑊
𝜏 is a scalar parameter that represents the dependence over time for a given observation at time t and t-1
while 𝜌 is the scalar parameter capturing the dependence between observation i at time t and observation j (i ≠ j) at
time t-1. The recursive relation after t time periods would be
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐺𝑦𝑡0 + (𝐼𝑛 + 𝐺 + 𝐺 2 + ⋯ + 6𝑡−1 )𝑋𝛽 + 𝑢
𝑢 = 𝐺 𝑡−1 𝜀𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝐺𝜀𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡
After a large t has passed, we can find the steady-state equilibrium assuming 𝐺 𝑡 ≈ 0𝑛 and zero expectation for the
disturbance terms. That is,
𝐸(𝑦𝑡 ) ≈ (𝐼𝑛 − 𝐺)−1 𝑋𝛽
𝐸(𝑦𝑡 ) ≈ (𝐼𝑛 (1 − 𝜏) − 𝜌𝑊)−1 𝑋𝛽
𝐸(𝑦𝑡 ) ≈ (𝐼𝑛

−1
𝜌
𝛽
𝑊) 𝑋
1−𝜏
1−𝜏

This is a reparameterization of the simultaneous model where
𝐸(𝑦𝑡 ) = (1 − 𝜌∗ 𝑊)−1 𝑋𝛽 ∗
𝜌∗ =

𝜌
1−𝜏

𝛽
1−𝜏
Note that the (1 − 𝜏)−1 is the same long-run multiplier from time-series literature.
𝛽∗ =
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4. Empirical strategy
4.1. Empirical specification
It has been noted that improper measures of market competitiveness which rely on ad-hoc
definitions of the hospital market may impart bias on the estimates (Kessler & McClellan, 1999).
For example, measures of the market extent such as government-defined boundaries, hospital
referral regions, and fixed and variable radii methods so often used in empirical studies related to
market structure may not contain all relevant competitors and thus can bias the effects of
competition measures which rely on these estimations (Sherer and Ross, 1990; Pindyck and
Rubinfield, 1998).5 The HHI, which sums the square of the shares of the market and is the most
prevalent method of measuring market competitiveness, ignores the geographic distribution of
hospitals within an area. Applied to hospitals, the shares may be computed as, for example, the
number of hospital beds as a fraction of total hospital beds in the county (James, 1997) or a
hospital’s admissions relative to the Hospital Referral Region/markets’ admissions (Ladapo,
2009). In any case, it is likely that the volume-shares which this measure relies on are a function
of unobserved heterogeneity related to the hospital quality (real or perceived) which is itself a
function of the technology it offers, that is, the HHI is endogenous. These bias the estimated
relationship between HHI as a measure of market competitiveness and hospital costs and/or
outcomes. It is worth noting that the underlying intuition behind the general approach outlined
here is that hospitals are strategically interacting with each other although these methods do not

The “fixed radii” method assumes that all hospital rivals exist within a given distance of a given hospital
while the “variable radii” method assumes a hospital’s rivals are any other hospital within a radius
specific to the hospital such as one that contains some percentage of the hospital’s patients.
5
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test directly for this behavior. The spatial autoregressive framework introduced below allows us
to mitigate much of the bias caused by these issues.
The spatial autoregressive probit model can be written structurally,
𝒚∗ = 𝑿𝜷 + 𝜌𝑾𝒚∗ + 𝜀,

𝜀~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀2 𝑰𝑵 )

(1)

Where 𝒚∗ , an 𝑁×1vector where N is the number of hospitals in the data set, is the underlying
(net-profit) decision process with elements 𝑦𝑖∗ that produces the observed binary outcome
whether hospital i operates a robot, denoted as an element 𝑦𝑖 of the 𝑁×1 vector 𝒚. The
relationship is established as
𝑦𝑖 = {

𝑦𝑖∗ > 0
𝑦𝑖∗ ≤ 0

1,
0,

As mentioned, the slope of the reaction function corresponds to the estimate of the spatial
lag parameter, a scalar 𝜌, which measures the strength (and direction) of the dependence and is
supported on [-1, 1]. Here, the spatial weights matrix 𝑾 is specified as a function of distance.
We have defined 𝑾 to be a row-normalized, inverse-distance 𝑁×𝑁 matrix with each
element, 𝑤𝑖𝑗 , expressing the degree of spatial proximity as:
−1
𝑑𝑖𝑗
−1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑒𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑠
𝑤𝑖𝑗 = {∑𝑗 𝑑𝑖𝑗
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

Where 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is defined as the distance between hospital i and j and we have bounded the matrix at
the ten nearest neighbors. 6,7 The inverse distance gives a lower weight to the decision of rivals

6

See Appendix B for details about the construction of spatial weights matrices.

7

The choice of ten neighbors was chosen after a model comparison using the Akaike information
criterion (AIC) and experimenting with the ideal number of neighbors to include in order to optimize the
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that are more distant from hospital i, pursuant to Tobler’s First Law of Geography which states,
“Everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things".
The N diagonal elements, 𝑤𝑖𝑖 , take the value of zero. Thus, 𝑾𝒚∗ is the spatial-weighted average
decision process of neighboring hospitals. Note that the normalization of the spatial weights
matrix along with the nearest-neighbors bound limit the allowable dependence. Finally, X
captures hospital demand and cost variables (e.g. structural measures characterizing the hospital
markets which ultimately determine the equilibrium provision of robotic technological services),
and 𝜀 represents the unobserved factors.
The spatial model nests the standard probit model so that if 𝜌 = 0, spatial dependence is
not present and we can rely on non-spatial methods. However, if 𝜌 ≠ 0, as is often the case with
units interacting in space, ignoring the neighboring outcomes by treating the model as nonspatial not only results in the omitted variable problem which biases the effects of the other
variables and but also sacrifices information available to the researcher (Case, 1992). Similarly, a
simultaneity exists due to the implied lack of independence; however, the current practice for
applied spatial probit estimation is to ignore this shortcoming rather than to omit a crucial
variable representing the underlying spatial interdependence. It has been shown that the bias
caused by the omission of a statistically significant spatial interdependence is more concerning
that the bias caused by these endogeneity concerns (Franzese & Hays, 2009).
4.2. Interpretation of estimates
In addition to the familiar non-linear aspect of the probit model, the potential dependence among
observations allows a change in the ith observation’s 𝑣th explanatory variable, 𝑥𝑖𝑣 , to affect not

underlying information. Our results are robust to these specifications. Full results for several of the
specifications are provided in the Appendix.
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only the own-𝑦𝑖 (expected probability of robot-adoption) but the other-𝑦𝑗 (𝑗 ≠ 𝑖) as well,
returning additional non-linearity. Note that this is not a direct effect of 𝑥𝑖𝑣 on 𝑦𝑗 , but rather the
effect 𝑥𝑖𝑣 has on 𝑦𝑖 which (potentially) affects 𝑦𝑗 . In other words, hospital i’s decision to adopt a
surgical robot may depend not only on its own hospital and market characteristics but also the
neighboring hospitals’ decisions which are a function of their own hospital and market
characteristics. For example, a hospital’s share of patients that are privately insured is expected
to be a determinant of the hospital’s decision to offer RAS; however, it is also possible that when
making the decision, the hospital will consider the neighboring hospitals’ decisions which are
determined by the neighbors’ own share of private insurance payers (i.e. a “spillover”). The
parameter estimates in spatial models contain additional information about the underlying,
potential spatial nature of the robot adoption decision process. Although not of particular interest
for this dissertation, these estimates can inform policy-makers and hospital administrators about
the nature of the spatial spillovers occurring across hospitals and their markets.
For simplification, let us begin by examining the differences between the marginal effects of
the non-spatial linear model and the spatial autoregressive model with a continuous dependent
variable.

Non-spatial / linear

Spatial autoregressive (continuous dep. var.)

E(∂yi ⁄∂xiv ) = βv

E(∂y⁄∂xv′ ) = (𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊)−1 (In βv )

Compared to the linear regression with its assumption of independence, we can see that the
marginal effect is not simply equivalent to the parameter estimate but rather an nxn matrix with
the following implication. The diagonal elements of this matrix contain the own-partial
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′
derivatives, 𝜕𝑦𝑖 ⁄𝜕𝑥𝑖,𝑣
. On the other hand, the off-diagonal elements consist of the cross-partial
′
derivatives, 𝜕𝑦𝑖 ⁄𝜕𝑥𝑗,𝑣
which capture the effect that changes in the neighboring explanatory

variables can have on the hospital i through the neighboring outcomes; these effects can be
thought of as the “spatial spillover”. Again, note that there is no direct effect of neighboring
hospital explanatory variables implied by the spatial autoregressive model. In fact, the effect is
through the impact that the neighboring hospitals’ explanatory variables have on these hospitals’
decisions to adopt the surgical robot. More specifically, we assume no correlation between
neighboring hospitals’ characteristics and a hospital’s error (Case, 1992). A scalar summary of
both of these effects can be obtained by averaging the values across the observations, generating
what is referred to as the direct effect and indirect effect, respectively. The sum of these effects
produces the total effect (LeSage et al., 2011).
Below is a side-by-side comparison of marginal effects for a non-spatial probit regression
and for a spatial probit regression which helps to illustrate the additional complexity introduced
when considering the probit counterpart to the above.
Non-spatial probit

Spatial probit

𝜕𝐸(𝑦|𝑥𝑟 )⁄𝜕𝑥𝑟 = 𝜙(𝑥𝑟 𝛽𝑟 )𝛽𝑟

𝜕𝐸(𝑦|𝑥𝑟 )⁄𝜕𝑥𝑟′ = 𝜙[(𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊)−1 𝐼𝑛 𝑥̅𝑟 𝛽𝑟 ]⨀ (𝐼𝑛
− 𝜌𝑊)−1 𝐼𝑛 𝛽𝑟

Where 𝜙(∙) is the standard normal probability density function, 𝑥̅𝑟 is the mean value of the rth
variable at which we evaluate the expression, and ⨀ represents multiplication element-byelement. In the case of the non-spatial probit, the marginal effect consists of a scalar parameter
estimate and the scaling expression by which it is multiplied. Analogously, the spatial probit
marginal effect consists of a matrix term multiplied element-by-element to a matrix scaling term.
It is from this expression that the diagonal elements are averaged to produce the direct effect and
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the off-diagonal elements are averaged to produce the indirect effect of the spatial probit
estimation (LeSage & Pace, 2009).
4.3. Estimation technique
Even if we were estimating a continuous dependent variable, the presence of autocorrelation
precludes estimation using OLS methods which requires independence of observations.
Moreover, for modeling the discrete outcome, the implied lack of independence across
observations is reflected in the likelihood being of n dimensions (cumulative normal) rather than
n one-dimensional likelihoods, the integration of which (necessary to obtain individual parameter
distributions) poses a challenge known as the “multidimensional integration issue”. Several
estimation techniques have been created to deal with this concern, but it is becoming most
common to estimate spatial probit using either frequentist recursive-importance sampling (RIS)
or, most often, Bayesian methods. See Billé and Arbia (2013) and Franzese & Hays (2009) for a
comprehensive review of spatial discrete choice estimation techniques. Bayesian methodology is
also preferred for small sample inferences.
The Bayesian approach to the spatial probit is based on augmenting the data to include
the latent vector, y*, which describes the underlying continuous distribution and determines with
certainty the discrete outcome, y. As LeSage and Pace (2009) note, Albert and Chib's (1993)
treatment of Bayesian probit can be extended to the spatial model so that 𝑝(𝛽, 𝜌|𝑦 ∗ , 𝑊) =
𝑝(𝛽, 𝜌|𝑦 ∗ , 𝑦, 𝑊). Thus, if we treat 𝐲 ∗ as an additional vector of parameters, the conditional
distribution will have the same form as in the Bayesian spatial autoregressive model with a
continuous dependent variable.8

8

See Appendix for the derivation of the full-conditional distributions for this model.
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We will state the likelihood in terms of the latent 𝐲 ∗ . 𝐿(𝒚∗ , 𝑾|𝜌, 𝜷) =
(2𝜋)−1 𝜎 −2(𝑛⁄2) |𝑰𝑛 − 𝜌𝑾|𝑒

− 1 2 (𝜺′ 𝜺)
2𝜎

where 𝜺 = (𝑰𝑛 − 𝜌𝑾)𝑦 ∗ − 𝑿𝜷 and select the following

independent diffuse prior distributions for parameters: 𝜷 ~ 𝑁(𝑐, 𝑇), where c = 0 and T is very
large and ρ ∼ Beta(a1, a2), where a1 = a2 = 1.9 To derive the parameter distributions, we wish to
integrate over the joint posterior distribution (likelihood, priors) with respect to each of the
parameters. Simulation methods provide a way in which we can numerically approximate the
multi-dimensional integral. In Monte Carlo simulation methods, we cycle through random draws
from the joint distribution collecting sample statistics. After sufficient samples are collected,
population parameters can be approximated. Given the high dimensionality of the spatial probit
likelihood, the joint posterior distribution is such that direct sampling from it is prohibitively
complex. However, we can rely on Markov chain Monte Carlo methods which takes samples by
“walking” around the distribution. From this distribution approximation, we can draw inferences
on the parameter distributions. Of this family, the Gibbs sampling methods is most used. Rather
than using independent draws from the joint distribution, Gibbs sampling relies on a sequence of
draws from the set of parameter conditional distributions to approximate the distribution. We
first derive individual conditional posterior distributions for each parameter: 𝑝(𝛽|𝜌, 𝑦 ∗ , 𝑦),
𝑝(𝜌|𝛽, 𝑦 ∗ , 𝑦), and 𝑝(𝑦 ∗ |𝛽, 𝜌, 𝑦) by selecting the parts of the joint distribution related to the
particular parameter. After selecting arbitrary beginning values for the parameters 𝛽0 , 𝜌0 , 𝑦0∗ , we
can then draw from the first parameter distribution conditional on the starting values of the other
distributions, e.g. 𝑝(𝛽1 |𝜌0 , 𝑦0∗ , 𝑦). The second parameter’s new value is then drawn conditional
on the new value of parameter one and the starting values of the remaining parameters, e.g.
𝑝(𝜌1 |𝛽1 , 𝑦0∗ , 𝑦). Sampling through the conditional densities, sequentially, through some high

9

Parameter ρ has limited support from [-1, 1].
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number of iterations (we use 10,000 with a burn-in of 1,000 iterations), a convergent state is
realized wherein all further draws would be from the targeted posterior joint distribution. In the
application of MCMC to the Bayesian spatial probit, the conditional distributions for the
parameters take the same form as in the Bayesian spatial autoregressive model with a continuous
dependent variable:
𝑝(𝛽|𝜌, 𝑦 ∗ ) ∝ 𝑁(𝑐 ∗ , 𝑇 ∗ )
𝑐 ∗ = (𝑋 ′ 𝑋 + 𝑇 −1 )−1 (𝑋 ′ 𝐴𝑦 ∗ + 𝑇 −1 𝑐)
𝑇 ∗ = (𝑋 ′ 𝑋 + 𝑇 −1 )−1
A=(𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊)
and
𝑝(𝜌|𝛽, 𝑦 ∗ ) ∝ |(𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊)|𝑒𝑥𝑝(−0.5[𝐴𝑦 ∗ − 𝑋𝛽]′[𝐴𝑦 ∗ − 𝑋𝛽]), a non-standard distribution due to
the determinant of (𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊) that requires the Metropolis-Hastings within the Gibbs sampling.
Very generally, Metropolis-Hastings requires that we generate a candidate sample from a
proposal distribution, and per an acceptance probability, we accept the candidate sample as part
of the posterior sample. Finally, given the observed 𝑦 and the parameters, 𝛽 and 𝜌, we have the
following truncated multivariate distribution for latent 𝑦 ∗
𝑦 ∗ ~𝑇𝑀𝑉𝑁{(𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊)−1 𝑋𝛽, [(𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊)′ (𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊)]−1 }
where as usual for identification, 𝜎𝜀2 = 1. Sampling of 𝑦 ∗ from the truncated multivariate normal
distribution requires an m-step Gibbs sampling method proposed by Geweke (1991).
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4.4. Data and descriptive characteristics
The dependent variable is whether hospital i offers service m in year t=2013, where m=
{open robotic assisted procedures, laparoscopic robotic assisted procedures, percutaneous robotic
assisted procedures, endoscopic robotic assisted procedures, thoracoscopic robotic assisted
procedures, other and unspecified robotic assisted procedures}. These services are exclusive to
hospitals and indicate the presence of a surgical robot.
Aside from the particular variable of interest, that is, the simultaneous spatially-weighted
provision of robotic surgery for hospital i’s rivals, the model controls for hospital i’s cost and
demand factors with the following variables: principal payer – percent of patients with Medicaid,
percent of patients with Medicare, percent of patients with private insurance; for-profit status;
number of licensed beds; and the following case-mix controls for the hospital market: percent
male, percent white, percent with Bachelor degree, percent over the age of 65, population density
(population per acre), median income (logged; $,000), and whether the hospital is located rurally.
Data Sources
Data comes from three main sources. The geographical Hospital Facilities in Florida
(2013) originates from the University of Florida GeoPlan Center. It contains hospital facility
addresses from seven different sources amounting to 341 hospitals in total. Since we compare
only acute care hospitals, all other hospital categories have been excluded. 10 The remaining
number of hospitals in this study totals 196. The geocoded hospitals are used in the calculation of
the inverse-distance weighting matrix, 𝑾.

10

Excluded hospital categories are: acute care/long term, children specialty, psychiatric, and
rehabilitation.
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Using a novel approach, we have constructed hospital-specific markets by aggregating
Census block group polygons that have their centroid within the 60-minute drive times estimated
in ArcGIS using all accessible streets.11 From these markets, which represent the catchment
areas, we estimate demographic market variables. In particular, we use 2010 US Census Bureau
Block Groups for the State of Florida with fields from 2009-2013 American Community Survey
(ACS). These data are at the block group level, where block groups are geographic entities
consisting of census blocks that are contained within the same census tract. Block groups are the
smallest census geography available which reduces the approximation error when apportioning
to the markets. The ideal size of a block group is 1,500 people; however, they contain anywhere
between 600-3000 individuals. ACS is collected annually; however, for block group it is
provided in 5-year increments. Hospital-specific characteristics from these data include case-mix
controls for the hospital’s market as specified above: median income, percent male, percent with
a Bachelor’s degree, percent white, percent 65 or older, and population density. Note that this
approach allows some overlapping of the market where hospitals draw their patients which
underlies the competition among hospitals.
The Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) provides Florida hospital inpatient
data including ICD-9-CM Procedure Codes. There are six ICD-9-CM Procedure Codes for
robotic-assisted surgeries (RAS). Additionally, as mentioned above, the following hospitalspecific cost characteristics, 𝛾𝑖 , are obtained from these data as hospital cost controls: percent of

11

From ESRI ArcGIS: A drive-time polygon is a region that encompasses all accessible streets that lie
within a specified drive time from that point. Drive-time polygons can be used to evaluate the
accessibility of a point with respect to some other features. For example, one-, two-, and three-minute
drive-time polygons around a grocery store can be used to determine which people are most likely to shop
at the store.
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patients with Medicare as principle payer, percent of patients with Medicaid as principle payer,
percent of patients with private insurance as principle payer, non-profit status of the hospital,
number of licensed beds and whether the hospital is in a rural locale.
Table 1 reports the descriptive characteristics of the sample hospitals and their markets.
Hospitals with and without robotic-assisted technology generally have similar characteristics.
Hospitals with the surgical robot are more likely to have a higher proportion of Medicaid and
private insurance payors. These hospitals are also more likely to be non-profit. Market income is
similar across hospitals with and without the robotic technology. Population density and the
number of licensed beds are higher, on average, for hospitals with the technology. However,
these hospitals are notably less likely to have Medicare payors and less likely to be in rural
locales. The full distribution of the variables is available in Appendix A.
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5. Empirical results
5.1. Results
Table 2 contains the estimation results from the spatial autoregressive probit estimation, SARP,
(column 1), and the non-spatial probit estimation (column 2), both estimated using Markov chain
Monte Carlo sampling. As discussed, the posterior means are not useful for interpreting
quantitatively how changes in the independent variables affect the probability that a hospital will
adopt a surgical robot; however, the signs will be informative. Moreover, from these effects we
can assess the spatial coefficient which is the primary focus of this study. We also report the
direct, indirect and total marginal effects, useful for interpreting the magnitude of the effects of
changes in explanatory variables (including the spatial spillovers) on the dependent variable.
These results are in Table 3.
5.1.1. Testing the MAR
First, we note that the spatial coefficient is significant, large, and negative which suggests that
when neighboring hospitals operate a robot, a given hospital is less likely to operate one. In
figure 3 are the distribution of draws from the random walk Metropolis-Hastings-within-Gibbs
sampling required for the spatial parameter, 𝜌. An overwhelming majority of the draws exist in
the negative space indicating a strong, negative spatial spillover effect from neighboring
hospitals.
Rather than a spatial clustering of hospitals with the surgical robot, the negative spatial
parameter indicates more of a checker board pattern in space where neighboring hospitals are
less likely to adopt a surgical robot for a given hospital with the technology. Indeed, hospitals
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appear to consider the behavior of neighboring hospitals, but not in a way that would be
consistent with a medical arms race. Instead, these results suggest an equilibrium of surgical
robot acquisition at which point in time (i.e., at least by 2013) hospitals have determined that it is
not a profit-maximizing decision to invest in this technology. This acts to counter
overinvestment in the medical technology.

Figure 5. Posterior distribution of the spatial parameter, rho

Of the hospital characteristics, the proportion of private insurance payers is positively
associated with the hospital’s provision of RAS. The number of licensed beds is also positively
associated with the probability of surgical robot adoption. Since the number of licensed beds is a
proxy for hospital size, we expect that hospitals of larger size have wider scope. As for the
market characteristics, rural hospitals are negatively associated with the decision to offer RAS.
The non-spatial probit model, also estimated using MCMC, indicates strong statistical
significance for all independent variables. The estimated effects of Medicare and Medicaid are
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notably higher in the non-spatial probit model. Many of the market characteristics are inversely
related to the dependent variable which is counter-intuitive. Given the significance of the spatial
parameter in column 1, the omitted variable problem may suggest biased and inconsistent
estimates in the non-spatial estimation.
5.1.2. Marginal effects
Next, we report the marginal impacts from which we can assess the magnitude of these effects
and uncover underlying spatial spillovers from neighboring hospital characteristics through their
impact on the hospitals’ RAS decisions. Table 3 summarizes these results.
Private insurance has a strong total impact on the probability, increasing it by 66 percent for
a one percent increase in private-payer share. This is after accounting for the 38 percent
reduction when neighboring hospitals’ private-payer share increases by one percent. Since the
direct effect is positive and the spatial parameter is negative, we would expect that as
neighboring hospitals’ share of private insurance payers increases (and this increases the
likelihood that the neighbors adopt the robot), hospital i would be less likely to invest in this
technology.
A hospital located in a rural setting is 23 percent less likely to offer RAS compared to a
hospital in a non-rural region. This is derived from a 37.2 percent reduction from the direct effect
and a 13.8 percent increase from the indirect effect. This suggests that a hospital is less likely to
have a surgical robot if the hospital is rural, but hospitals with rural neighboring hospitals are
more likely to offer RAS. This would make sense since a rural hospital is less likely to have a
surgical robot, but a hospital is more likely to have a surgical robot if the neighboring hospitals
do not have a surgical robot.
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5.2. Further analyses
5.2.1. Earlier period
Given the checker board spatial pattern observed in our sample of hospitals from 2013, we have
suggested that we have observed an equilibrium as laid out in Reinganum (1981). That is, at first
competition increases the diffusion of a technology as first-movers attempt to gain competitive
advantage. As more firms adopt the technology the market share will decrease and along with it
the incentive to adopt the technology. Given the dynamic nature of this explanation, as a
robustness check we can perform the same analysis completed for 2013 data to an earlier period
to identify whether in a period prior to 2013, competition is seen to enhance adoption of
technology. A positive and significant spatial parameter from this estimation would support this
theory. We have completed the earlier-period analysis for 2011. The results of this analysis are
reported in table 4.
The negative and significant rho coefficient on the spatial lag indicates that the same
spatial pattern occurs in 2011 as in 2013. A hospital is less likely to offer RAS if neighboring
hospitals have done so. The rates of uptake outlaid in figure 1 indicate that an even earlier timeperiod may be more useful in establishing robustness to the theory. Perhaps in 2008 or 2009
competition was having a positive effect on the technology adoption. Unfortunately, 2011 is the
earliest year for which we can obtain the necessary data for our geographical boundaries used in
the construction of the hospital markets.
5.2.2. Hospital capacity
Hospitals with a surgical robot tend to be larger in terms of the number of licensed beds. It is
possible that the reported results reflect the interaction between nearby hospitals that do not
necessarily compete with each other due to difference in capacity. For example, a small hospital
may not consider a neighboring large hospital to be a competitor for high-tech services and may
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indeed be less likely to offer those services once the larger hospital has established this service
and the stated results may simply capture this effect. Although we control for the number of
licensed beds, given that the Bayesian estimation allows for inferences on small samples, we
consider a specification excluding hospitals with fewer than 75 licensed beds to test for these
non-linear effects across hospital capacity. The results, found in column 2 of Table 5,
corroborate what we have found using the full sample of hospitals indicating that even among
just the larger hospitals, there is a reduced probability of offering RAS if a neighboring large
hospital has the service. The -0.651 rho parameter for the 𝑾𝒚∗ remains negative and significant.
5.2.3. Hospital networks
It may be important to distinguish hospitals that are part of a system from those who are standalone hospitals because networked or system hospitals may choose to provide certain services at
one or a select number of locations since they can coordinate care across the different locations,
that is, a within-network strategic interaction. Although not all networked hospitals may organize
this way and other important factors may be involved, this provides a straight-forward way to
distinguish a non-adoption decision due to strategic interaction across hospitals (or hospitalnetworks) from a non-adoption decision due to within-network strategy. Since some hospitals in
our sample are in fact a part of a larger hospital network or system in which the delivery of
services may be a coordinated effort, we have estimated a model including a dummy variable
indicating those as such. The results from this specification appear in column 3 in Table 5. The
consideration of the network has little effect on the spatial lag which is still strongly negative and
significant.
5.2.4. Intensive margin
It may also be of interest to investigate whether, among hospitals that do have a surgical robot,
there is a tendency for RAS to be performed more frequently when neighboring hospitals with
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the technology are performing high levels of RAS. This would provide some evidence of
“treatment creep” which is the tendency for the unnecessary provision of health care services
motivated by generating revenue, sometimes to recuperate extensive costs in the investment of
expensive medical technologies. Given that the hospitals have a similar, even overlapping,
market of patients from which to draw, we expect the levels of RAS intensity to be similar unless
indicative of “treatment creep”. We estimate a model as in (1) using the spatial autoregressive
specification with a continuous dependent variable which represents the percentage of the
hospital’s procedures that were RAS. The results at the intensive margin are provided in column
4 of Table 5. Only private insurance has significance such that those hospitals with more privateinsurance-payer patients are more likely to make use of the surgical robot. The spatial parameter
is not statistically significant indicating that the intensity of robot usage is independent of the
intensity of use at neighboring hospitals with the technology.
5.2.5. Traditional MAR
As a point of reference, we have estimated the model to reflect the conventional testing of the
medical arms race hypothesis. That is, we have constructed a hospital-specific HHI by finding
for each hospital the ratio of its licensed beds to the number of licensed beds in its market, then
squaring these shares. For each hospital market, we identify and sum the four largest squared
shares of licensed beds. The computed HHI ranges from 72.12 to 10,000 with a mean of 1,555
for the 196 hospitals for which this measure could be computed. Estimation was performed via
MCMC probit with 10,000 iterations and a burn-in period of 1,000. Table 5, column 5 reports the
results of this specification whose only difference from the SARP model is to replace the
spatially-weighted average of nearest neighboring hospitals’ provision of RAS with a more
general construct of market competition, the HHI.
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First, we note that the HHI is statistically significant and positive but negligible. This
suggests that in more concentrated markets (i.e. less competitive), a hospital may be slightly
more likely to offer RAS. This result contrasts with the post-managed care literature from
Melnick & Zwanziger (1988) that identifies a loss of correlation between market concentration
and hospital costs. Compared to the specification in which we control directly for competition
via the spatially-weighted neighboring hospital robot decisions, many of the other variables have
statistical significance although there is consistency regarding the signs and magnitudes of the
coefficients for all except the proportion of Medicare payers which is here positively associated
with the provision of the technology.
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6. Conclusion
We conclude that a spatial strategic interaction among hospitals does exist and that the adoption
of the surgical robot among hospitals in the state of Florida occurs not as a result of but in spite
of the decision of competing hospital’s decision to offer robotic-assisted procedures. In
particular, it is more likely for non-neighboring hospitals to adopt the robotic technology. This
particular spatial pattern we observe can be explained by Reinganum's (1981) theory that
competition acts to limit the diffusion of the surgical robot. These results are not sensitive to
restricting competition to hospitals of similar (large) capacity which might be more likely to
consider each other rivals. Networks of hospitals were considered as well without substantially
affecting our main results. The study lends support to the theory that competition does not
necessarily lead to the overprovision of medical technology, an important finding for all
healthcare stakeholders.
Compared to other studies on the adoption of the surgical robot that find less concentrated
markets are associated with robot adoption (Wright et al. 2016; Barbash et al. 2014, Li et al.
2014), our study relies on a spatial approach to address the underlying mechanism through which
competition may affect the decision to adopt the technology and we find that the strategic
interaction underlying competition actually serves to limit the adoption of the technology. We
also find that, conditional on robot ownership, a hospital is no more likely to use the robot if
facing more competition. These results corroborate with Wright et al. (2016).
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Limitations of the current study include the inability to claim causal statements given the
cross-sectional nature of the data. Because we cannot control for time-invariant, unobservable
characteristics of the hospital such as management style (a key factor in technology adoption, as
mentioned in section 2), we cannot conclusively determine that the neighboring hospital’s
decision to offer robotic surgery caused a given hospital to not offer the surgical robot. We can
say only that, in equilibrium, the decision is (negatively) related to the decision of neighboring
hospitals or that a hospital is less likely to offer robotic surgery if neighboring hospitals do so, on
average. The current approach also assumes that the strategic interaction determined by the
analysis occurs between all pairs of hospitals whereas localized differences in strategic
interaction are possible. Finally, it is worth noting that medical technology is subject to
improvements and innovation. Furthermore, with regards to the cost side of welfare, throughout
the period of this study, Intuitive is the monopolist in the surgical robot market. Some of the
company’s initial patents have expired. As more suppliers enter the market, we can expect the
costs of the surgical robot, disposables and maintenance contracts will decline. The purpose of
this study was to investigate whether hospitals were making the decision to procure technology
(i.e. surgical robots) as a result of competitive pressures. It therefore took advantage of the
timespan during which clinical evidence in support of the adoption was lacking to provide
insight onto competition behavior in the hospital market with respect to welfare-reducing effects
of less concentrated hospital markets.
In addition to the empirical findings which can shed light on the strategic interaction among
hospitals with regard to medical technology adoption, this paper seeks to further the application
of the spatial autoregressive model which can be useful for investigating social learning, learning
from others and technological externalities (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Conley and Udry,
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2001; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010). More importantly, we wish to contribute to the limited
application of discrete choice spatial models specifically.
Further research relating to this topic may attempt to make more thorough consideration of
the hospital networks which are growing, especially in response to structural changes in the
healthcare market, and which pose a challenge for the current spatial methodologies.
Additionally, in a future study we may be able to investigate whether hospitals respond to
neighboring hospitals’ technology procurement decisions by offering a strategic substitute
medical technology. This can be accomplished using the spatial Durbin regression model, an
extension of the spatial autoregressive model in which the neighboring hospital characteristics
are also a weighted independent variable. The applications of the spatial approach to the
healthcare market are vast, as the impact of competition is a topic of continuous study, especially
as the healthcare market faces structural changes in our attempt to improve the healthcare system
in this country.
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Table 2. Descriptive characteristics
Hospitals without surgical robot (n=84)
Variable
Medicare
Medicaid
private insurance
non-profit
market income (log; $,000)
market male
market bachelor
market white
market 65+
population density (per acre)
licensed beds
rural

Mean

SE

Min

Max

0.565
0.156
0.156
0.357
3.374
49.497
11.153
76.861
25.232
0.645
157.964
0.274

0.174
0.137
0.087
0.482
0.199
1.527
1.888
5.483
6.130
0.497
185.030
0.449

0.001
0.000
0.000
0.000
3.000
48.293
5.633
67.376
14.329
0.023
20.000
0.000

0.857
0.683
0.536
1.000
3.987
56.084
13.406
90.302
43.198
1.992
1493.000
1.000

Hospitals with surgical robot (n=112)
Variable
Medicare
Medicaid
private insurance
non-profit
market income (log; $,000)
market male
market bachelor
market white
market 65+
population density (per acre)
licensed beds
rural

Mean

SE

Min

Max

0.478
0.196
0.208
0.420
3.394
48.883
11.847
75.446
25.157
0.871
356.732
0.027

0.134
0.101
0.080
0.496
0.171
0.791
1.291
5.496
5.313
0.483
216.899
0.162

0.142
0.019
0.085
0.000
3.005
48.228
6.212
62.251
16.030
0.104
62.000
0.000

0.778
0.468
0.462
1.000
3.942
54.235
13.458
87.170
40.503
2.097
1217.000
1.000

Notes. The full sample consists of 196 long-term, acute-care hospitals in the state of Florida in 2013.
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Table 3. Spatial and non-spatial probit estimation results

Medicare
Medicaid
private insurance
non-profit
market income (log; $,000)
market male
market bachelor
market white
market 65+
population density (per acre)
licensed beds
rural
Wy

Observations

(1)
SARP
-0.003
(2.84)
0.717
(2.44)
3.691*
(2.11)
0.117
(0.23)
1.270
(1.08)
-0.360
(0.24)
-0.089
(0.13)
-0.027
(0.04)
-0.021
(0.04)
-0.342
(0.46)
0.002***
(0.00)
1.315***
(0.47)
-0.610**
(0.25)
196

(2)
Probit
0.340***
(0.04)
1.208***
(0.05)
3.777***
(0.04)
0.086***
(0.00)
1.255***
(0.02)
-0.317***
(0.00)
-0.128***
(0.00)
-0.012***
(0.00)
-0.024***
(0.00)
-0.502***
(0.01)
0.002***
(0.00)
-1.167***
(0.01)

196

Notes. The dependent variable is whether the hospital provides a RAS procedure. Column 1 contains the estimates
from the spatial autoregressive probit (SARP) model estimated using MCMC methods with diffuse priors. Reported
estimates are the full conditional means based on 10,000 samples after 1,000-sample burn-in. Estimates in column 2
are from the non-spatial probit model estimated using MCMC. Standard errors of the means are in parenthesis.
Coefficients that are significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 percent levels are marked with ***, **, * respectively.

55

Table 4. Marginal effects from the SARP estimation

(a) Direct effects
Lower Posterior mean Upper
Medicare
-1.010
0.001
1.016
Medicaid
-0.936
0.205
1.347
private insurance
0.069
1.044
2.010
non-profit
-0.076
0.033
0.142
market income (log; $,000) -0.142
0.359
0.854
market male
-0.214
-0.102
0.008
market bachelor
-0.087
-0.025
0.039
market white
-0.026
-0.008
0.011
market 65+
-0.023
-0.006
0.012
population density (per acre) -0.309
-0.096
0.121
licensed beds
0.000
0.001
0.001
rural
-0.581
-0.372
-0.165
Notes. Upper and lower refer to the 95% confidence interval.

(b) Indirect effects

(c) Total effects

Lower Posterior mean Upper
-0.403
-0.001
0.396
-0.536
-0.076
0.363
-0.844
-0.383
0.005
-0.057
-0.012
0.029
-0.363
-0.132
0.053
-0.004
0.038
0.091
-0.015
0.009
0.035
-0.004
0.003
0.011
-0.005
0.002
0.009
-0.048
0.034
0.125
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.029
0.138
0.256

Lower Posterior mean Upper
-0.639
0.000
0.641
-0.590
0.129
0.860
0.044
0.662
1.316
-0.047
0.021
0.092
-0.088
0.226
0.548
-0.138
-0.064
0.004
-0.056
-0.016
0.024
-0.016
-0.005
0.007
-0.015
-0.004
0.007
-0.199
-0.062
0.075
0.000
0.000
0.001
-0.382
-0.234
-0.102
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Table 5. Earlier time-period

Medicare
Medicaid
private insurance
non-profit
market income (log; $,000)
market male
market bachelor
market white
market 65+
population density (per acre)
licensed beds
rural
Wy

(1)
SARP
2013
-0.003
(2.84)
0.717
(2.44)
3.691*
(2.11)
0.117
(0.23)
1.270
(1.08)
-0.360
(0.24)
-0.089
(0.13)
-0.027
(0.04)
-0.021
(0.04)
-0.342
(0.46)
0.002***
(0.00)
1.315***
(0.47)
-0.610**
(0.25)

(2)
SARP
2011
1.939
(2.21)
3.036
(2.57)
6.730***
(2.18)
-0.043
(0.24)
-0.372
(1.19)
-0.099
(0.23)
0.077
(0.14)
-0.003
(0.04)
0.018
(0.04)
-0.257
(0.45)
0.002***
(0.00)
-1.084**
(0.52)
-0.619**
(0.25)

196

196

Observations

Notes. The dependent variable is whether the hospital provides a RAS procedure. Column 1 contains the estimates
from the spatial autoregressive probit (SARP) model estimated using MCMC methods with diffuse priors for 2013 and
column 2 contains same for 2011. Reported estimates are the full conditional means based on 10,000 samples after
1,000-sample burn-in. Standard errors of the means are in parenthesis. Coefficients that are significant at the 0.01,
0.05, and 0.1 percent levels are marked with ***, **, * respectively.
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Table 6. Other robustness checks
(1)
SARP 2013
Medicare
-0.003
(2.84)
Medicaid
0.717
(2.44)
private insurance
3.691*
(2.11)
non-profit
0.117
(0.23)
market income (log; $,000)
1.270
(1.08)
market male
-0.360
(0.24)
market bachelor
-0.089
(0.13)
market white
-0.027
(0.04)
market 65+
-0.021
(0.04)
population density (per acre)
-0.342
(0.46)
licensed beds
0.002***
(0.00)
rural
-1.315***
(0.47)

(2)
SARP - Large
-0.738
(2.72)
-0.227
(3.07)
5.322*
(2.82)
0.094
(0.26)
2.337*
(1.20)
-0.243
(0.28)
-0.352**
(0.17)
-0.047
(0.04)
-0.032
(0.04)
-0.403
(0.52)
0.002**
(0.00)
-0.715
(0.73)

network

(3)
SARP Network
0.154
(2.17)
0.875
(2.44)
4.024*
(2.13)
0.148
(0.24)
1.358
(1.08)
-0.360
(0.24)
-0.093
(0.14)
-0.024
(0.04)
-0.024
(0.04)
-0.311
(0.47)
0.002***
(0.00)
-1.303***
(0.47)
-0.179
(0.23)

(4)
LPM - Intensive
0.010
(0.02)
-0.008
(0.02)
0.044**
(0.02)
-0.001
(0.00)
0.007
(0.01)
-0.002
(0.00)
-0.001
(0.00)
0.000
(0.00)
0.000
(0.00)
0.000
(0.00)
0.000
(0.00)
-0.002
(0.00)

0.000***
(0.00)

HHI
Wy

Observations

(5)
HHI
0.372***
(0.05)
1.264***
(0.05)
3.806***
(0.04)
0.091***
(0.00)
1.275***
(0.02)
-0.351***
(0.01)
-0.141***
(0.00)
-0.012***
(0.00)
-0.024
(0.00)
-0.458***
(0.01)
0.002***
(0.00)
-1.218***
(0.01)

-0.610**
(0.25)
196

-0.651***
(0.25)
164

-0.612**
(0.25)
196

0.111
(0.23)
112

196

Notes. The dependent variable is whether the hospital provides a RAS procedure. Column 1 contains the estimates from the spatial
autoregressive probit (SARP) model for comparison. Estimates in column 2 correspond to the analysis excluding smaller hospitals.
Column 3 adds a network dummy variable to the specification. The intensive margin is assessed for the hospitals with the surgical robot
in column 4. Column 5 represents the HHI-based approach to competition on the technology adoption. Standard errors of the means
are in parenthesis. Coefficients that are significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 percent levels are marked with ***, **, * respectively.
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Appendix A. Variables
Summary of variables, their calculation and the rationale for inclusion follows. Note that all
market variables have been created by first establishing a hospital’s market using DriveTime
analysis in ArcGIS 10.3, which superimposes a polygon on the Census Block Groups (CBG)
corresponding to 60-minute drive times using all current available, accessible roadways. Using
the rule that the CBG will be included in the market if the polygon contains the populationweighted centroid of the CBG, we aggregate the variables of interest and calculate proportions.
These hospital-specific market boundaries allow for both variation in market characteristics and
overlapping of potential patients which underlies competition.
Table 7

Table A.1. Table of variables
Variable
Dependent
robot

Description

Rationale for Inclusion

a binary variable for whether
hospital i offers service m
where m= {open robotic
assisted procedures,
laparoscopic robotic assisted
procedures, percutaneous
robotic assisted procedures,
endoscopic robotic assisted
procedures, thoracoscopic
robotic assisted procedures,
other and unspecified robotic
assisted procedures}

inconclusive evidence on the
health outcomes of roboticassisted surgery when
compared to traditional
methods, coupled with the
expenses suggests roboticassisted surgical procedures
are a component of the
“medical arms” in the arms
race

Independent
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spatial_lag

principle payer medicare
(‘compositional
variable’;
medicaid
omitted
category is
private
‘other’)
non_profit

lmrkt_inc

mrkt_male

mrkt_bach

mrkt_white

spatially-weighted linear
combination of the decision
of neighboring hospitals to
provide robotic surgery

percent of patients with
Medicare insurance
percent of patients with
Medicaid insurance
percent of patients with
private insurance
a binary variable for whether
hospital i is non-profit
(omitted category includes:
investor owned, Federal,
public/government, State)
hospital market median
income

percentage of the GISdefined hospital market
population total that are male
percentage of the GISdefined hospital market
population total with a
Bachelor degree
percentage of the GISdefined hospital market
population total that are
white
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hospitals may interact
strategically in a
complementary way,
providing specialized
services that are unique to
the market, or in a substitute
manner, offering the same
specialized services as
neighboring hospitals; or
strategic interaction may not
exist at all
insurance coverage and
reimbursement rates may
impact a hospital’s decision
to provide robot-assisted
procedures

case-mix control; hospitals in
wealthier markets may be
incentivized to advertise
and/or provide specialized
services; alternatively, since
correlated with bachelor,
may reduce the need for
certain specialized services
given a reduced likelihood of
disease
case-mix control; certain
diseases and therefore
treatments vary by gender
case-mix control; certain
diseases and therefore
treatments vary by education
case-mix control; certain
diseases and therefore
treatments vary by race

mrkt_65

pop_dens

percentage of the GISdefined hospital market
population total that are 65+
years in age
hospital market population;
market summed population
over market summed acres

licensed beds number of licensed beds in
hospital
rural

binary variable indicating
whether hospital is located in
rural area
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case-mix control; certain
diseases and therefore
treatments vary by age
case-mix control; hospitals in
larger markets may be
themselves larger hospitals,
offering more services
proxy for hospital size; larger
hospitals may have more
scope

Below are the full histograms for the independent variables.
Table 8

Table A.2. Histograms of independent variables
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Appendix B. Spatial weights and exploratory spatial analysis
B.1. Spatial weights matrix
The spatial weighting matrix is the positive 𝑁×𝑁 matrix 𝑾 where each element is a spatial
weight, 𝑤𝑖𝑗 : 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛, that summarizes the spatial relations between the 𝑛 units in space. The
diagonal elements are conventionally set to 0 to indicate one is not a neighbor to itself, that is,
𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 0 for all 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛. The off-diagonal elements, 𝑤𝑖𝑗 , 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖, can be defined a number of
different ways depending on the particular situation being modeled. For example, 𝑤𝑖𝑗 = 1 if
distance between i and j is ≤ 𝑘; alternatively, 𝑤𝑖𝑗 = 1 for m nearest neighbors; or another option
is 𝑤𝑖𝑗 = 1 if i and j are contiguous. Estimating the spatial weights matrix elements precludes
identification, so some assumption on the particular nature of the spatial relationship is required.
We have defined 𝑾 to be row-normalized, inverse-distance with each element, 𝑤𝑖𝑗 , expressing
the degree of spatial proximity as:
−1
𝑑𝑖𝑗
−1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑒𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑠
𝑤𝑖𝑗 = {∑𝑗 𝑑𝑖𝑗
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

Where 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is defined as the distance between hospital i and j and the n diagonal elements, 𝑤𝑖𝑖 ,
take the value of zero Thus, 𝑾𝒚 is the spatial-weighted average of the neighbor outcomes.
A simple example will illustrate the above. The following table summarizes the relationship
between three units in space. In parentheses are the distances between units.
Unit Neighbors (distance)
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1

2 (2), 3(1)

2

1 (2), 3(3)

3

1 (1), 2(3)

−1
This information can be summarized in an inverse-distance matrix wherein each element, 𝑑𝑖𝑗
,

represents the inverse of the distance between units i and j. For instance, 𝐷 =
0
1⁄
2
( 1

1⁄
2 1
0 1⁄3
1⁄
3 0 )

We can then divide each element in the row by the sum of the row-elements to define the new
−1
elements of the row-normalized 𝑾 , ∑𝑛𝑗=1 𝑑𝑖𝑗
, = 1 , 𝑖 = 1, . . , 𝑛

0
𝑾 = 3⁄5
3
( ⁄4

1⁄
3
0
1⁄
4

2⁄
3
2⁄
5
0 )

1⁄ 𝑦 + 2⁄ 𝑦
3 2
3 3
′
3
2
If 𝒚 = (𝑦1 , 𝑦2 , 𝑦3 ) then 𝑾𝒚 =
⁄5 𝑦1 + ⁄5 𝑦3 , a spatial-weighted average of neighboring
3
1
( ⁄4 𝑦1 + ⁄4 𝑦2 )
response variables.
B.2. Moran’s I
It is possible to measure the positive, negative, or nonexistent degree to which observations with
location have similar attributes, that is, spatial autocorrelation. We first estimate a non-spatial
regression and save the residuals. Then, a global spatial autocorrelation can be tested for using
the Moran’s I statistic which takes the form 𝐼 =

∑𝑖 ∑𝑗 𝑤𝑖𝑗 (𝑋𝑖 −𝑋̅)(𝑋𝑗 −𝑋̅ )
𝑁
∑𝑖 ∑𝑗 𝑤𝑖𝑗
∑𝑖(𝑋𝑖 −𝑋̅ )2

. Moran’s I is

asymptotically normal under the null hypothesis that no spatial autocorrelation exists, so for our
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sample we can interpret the test statistic

𝐼−𝐸[𝐼]
√𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐼)

as a p-value. Given the results below, we are

unable to reject the null hypothesis that no global spatial autocorrelation exists. In other words,
the data appear to exhibit overall complete spatial randomness. However, the Moran’s I statistic
is limited by being a global statistical measurement which means it is best for identifying a
certain relationship pattern that exists across the whole study area and is incapable of identifying
particular spatial clustering (Hongfei Li, Calder, & Cressie, 2007). Note that these results are a
function of the form of 𝑾 which means improperly specified weights may lead to a type II error.
This statistic’s limitations are not well established. For example, it has been shown that Moran’s
I is only an accurate measure of the spatial dependence if the spatial parameter is near zero.

Table 9

Table B.1. Moran's I test statistic
Moran I statistic standard deviate = -0.2606, p-value = 0.7944
alternative hypothesis: two.sided
sample estimates:
Observed Moran I Expectation
Variance
-0.0329
-0.0263
0.0006
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Appendix C. Bayesian analysis
C.1. Derivation of the Bayesian SAR full conditionals
We include the derivation of the full conditional distributions from the spatial autoregressive
model with a continuous outcome as estimated in the intensive margin analysis.
𝑦 = 𝜌𝑊𝑦 + 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀, where 𝜀~𝑁(0, 𝜎 2 𝐼𝑛 )
Note:
𝑦 − 𝜌𝑊𝑦 = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀
𝑦(𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊) = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀
𝑦 = (𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊)−1(𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀)
𝜀 = 𝐴𝑦 − 𝑋𝛽
Where 𝐴 = 𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊
𝑛

𝑛

Likelihood: 𝐿(𝑦, 𝑋, 𝑊|𝛽, 𝜎 2 , 𝜌) = (2𝜋)− 2 (𝜎 2 )− 2 |𝐴|exp{−0.5𝜎 −2 (𝐴𝑦 − 𝑋𝛽)′(𝐴𝑦 − 𝑋𝛽)}

Prior distributions:
(𝛽, 𝜎 2 )~𝑁𝐼𝐺(𝑐, 𝑇, 𝑎, 𝑏)
𝜋(𝛽, 𝜎 2 ) = 𝜋(𝛽|𝜎 2 )𝜋(𝜎 2 ) = 𝑁(𝑐, 𝜎 2 𝑇)𝐼𝐺(𝑎, 𝑏)
= (2𝜋)

−

𝑘
𝑘
1
−
−
2 (𝜎 2 ) 2 |𝑇| 2 exp{−0.5𝜎 −2 (𝛽

− 𝑐)′𝑇

−1

𝑏𝑎
(𝜎 2 )−(𝑎+1) 𝑒𝑥𝑝{−0.5𝜎 −2 2𝑏}
(𝛽 − 𝑐)}×
Γ(𝑎)

Full posterior:
𝑝(𝛽, 𝜎 2 , 𝜌|𝑦, 𝑋, 𝑊)
𝑛 𝑘

∝ (𝜎 2 )−(2+2+𝑎+1) |𝐴|exp{−0.5(𝜎 2 )−1 [(𝐴𝑦 − 𝑋𝛽)′ (𝐴𝑦 − 𝑋𝛽)
+ (𝛽 − 𝑐)′ 𝑇 −1 (𝛽 − 𝑐) + 2𝑏]}
Expanding the terms within squared brackets,
𝑦 ′ 𝐴′ 𝐴𝑦 − 𝑦 ′ 𝐴′ 𝑋𝛽 − 𝛽 ′ 𝑋 ′ 𝐴𝑦 + 𝛽 ′ 𝑋 ′ 𝑋𝛽 + 𝛽 ′ 𝑇 −1 𝛽 − 𝛽 ′ 𝑇 −1 𝑐 − 𝑐 ′ 𝑇 −1 𝛽 + 𝑐 ′ 𝑇 −1 𝑐 + 2𝑏
= 𝛽 ′ (𝑋 ′ 𝑋 + 𝑇 −1 )𝛽 − 𝛽 ′ (𝑋 ′ 𝐴𝑦 + 𝑇 −1 𝑐) − (𝑦 ′ 𝐴′ 𝑋 + 𝑐 ′ 𝑇 −1 )𝛽 + 𝑐 ′ 𝑇 −1 𝑐 + 2𝑏 + 𝑦 ′ 𝐴′ 𝐴𝑦
If we let
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𝑐 ∗ = (𝑋 ′ 𝑋 + 𝑇 −1 )(𝑋 ′ 𝐴𝑦 + 𝑇 −1 𝑐)
𝑇 ∗ = (𝑋 ′ 𝑋 + 𝑇 −1 )−1
𝑏 ∗ = 𝑏 + 0.5(𝑐 ′ 𝑇 −1 𝑐 + 𝑦 ′ 𝐴′ 𝐴𝑦 + 𝑦 ′ 𝐴′ 𝑋 + 𝑐 ′ 𝑇 −1 )
𝑎∗ =

𝑛
+𝑎
2

Then,
(𝛽, 𝜎 2 , 𝜌|𝑦, 𝑋, 𝑊) ∝ (𝜎 2 )−(𝑎

∗

𝑘
+ +1)
2
|𝐴|exp{−0.5(𝜎 2 )−1 [(𝛽

− 𝑐 ∗ )′ (𝑇 ∗ )−1 (𝛽 − 𝑐 ∗ ) + 2𝑏 ∗ ]}

This posterior distribution is close to but not exactly a tractable form (i.e. the NIG prior is not a
conjugate).
If 𝜌 = 0 then 𝐴 = 𝐼𝑛 and, indeed, 𝛽, 𝜎 2 |𝑦, 𝑋, 𝑊~𝑁𝐼𝐺[𝑐 ∗ , 𝑇 ∗ −1 , 𝑎∗ , 𝑏 ∗ ]

An uninformative prior, 𝑎, 𝑏 = 0; 𝑇 −1 = 0 allows us to simplify the posterior
𝑛

∝ (𝜎 2 )− 2 |𝐴|exp{−0.5𝜎 −2 (𝐴𝑦 − 𝑋𝛽)′(𝐴𝑦 − 𝑋𝛽)}𝑝(𝜌)

C.2. Convergence diagnostics for simulation-based Bayesian inference
Useful for determining convergence, the figure below displays the trace plot of the spatial
parameter from the MCMC. The plot mixes across most of the distribution and centers/becomes
stationary on -0.5 (i.e. the mean and variance are relatively constant), indicating it likely
approximates the right posterior distribution of rho with the user-set burn-in period of 1000. The
convergence diagnostics and posterior distributions for all parameters follow, each displaying
proper convergence behavior.
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Figure 6. Trace plot and posterior distribution for the spatial parameter, rho
Figure 6. Trace plot and posterior distribution for the spatial parameter, rho
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Figure 7. Trace plot and posterior distribution for independent variables (Continued on Next
Page)
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Figure 7. Trace plot and posterior distribution for independent variables (Continued on Next
Page)
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Figure 7. Trace plot and posterior distribution for independent variables (Continued on Next
Page)
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Figure 7. Trace plot and posterior distribution for independent variables (Continued on Next
Page)

72

Figure 7. Trace plot and posterior distribution for independent variables (Continued on Next
Page)
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1

Figure 7. Trace plot and posterior distribution for independent variables (Continued on Next
Page)
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C.3. Selection of number of neighbors; AIC model comparison
In addition to specifying the elements of the spatial weights matrix, 𝑾, to be of inverse-distance
which assigns a greater weight to hospitals that are nearer in proximity, we also assume there is a
limit to the number of hospitals a given hospital may consider a rival. Beyond this threshold, the
𝑤𝑖𝑗 will take the value of zero. This is a reasonable assumption since the hospital sample spans
the entire state of Florida. Note that LeSage & Pace (2014) claim that a well-specified and
properly interpreted spatial regression model is not sensitive to the assumed structure of the
spatial relationship captured in 𝑾. Nonetheless, to attempt to reveal the optimal number of rival
hospitals for the spatial weights matrix, we estimate the model with several specifications of 𝑾
using the k nearest neighbors. To determine the “stopping point”, we then use the Akaike
information criterion (AIC) which evaluates the fit of the specification while penalizing for
overfitting to minimize loss of information. In this form of model comparison, the lower AIC
reflects the optimal model. This criterion is similar to one utilized by Kostov (2010) in attempt to
find the “optimal” weighting matrix. Results for several of the specifications are reported in
Table C.1. There are minimal differences in the measure of AIC (as well as the posterior means
estimates); for each value of k tested; however, we take the results to indicate the optimal
number of neighbors for the leading model to be k=10. Note that the optimal k will vary
depending on the specification and we adjust accordingly. These results provide some empirical
robustness to the conclusion of LeSage and Pace (2014) about the lack of sensitivity in the
estimates to assumptions in 𝑾. Moreover, as explained by LeSage and Pace (2014), differences
in estimates found while testing variations of the weighting matrix are likely the result of
improper specification of the regression model which lends support to the specification described
in Section 4.
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Table 10

Table C.1. Selection of the k nearest neighbors; AIC comparison

(Intercept)
Medicare
Medicaid
Private insurance
Non-profit
Log(med. income)
Market male
Market Bachelor's
Market white
Market 65+
Population density
Licensed beds
Rural
Wy (rho parameter)
AIC

SARP(k=8)
Mean Pr(>|z|)

SARP (k=9)
Mean Pr(>|z|)

SARP (k=10)
Mean Pr(>|z|)

SARP (k=11)
Mean Pr(>|z|)

18.885
0.167
0.964
4.010
0.109
1.381
-0.418
-0.100
-0.027
-0.023
-0.356
0.002
-1.297
-0.665

17.026
0.073
0.844
3.719
0.104
1.366
-0.380
-0.091
-0.027
-0.023
-0.362
0.002
-1.314
-0.599

16.361
0.096
0.878
3.802
0.103
1.305
-0.365
-0.091
-0.026
-0.021
-0.332
0.002
-1.317
-0.609

15.007
0.168
0.976
3.691
0.105
1.179
-0.334
-0.097
-0.023
-0.020
-0.290
0.002
-1.250
-0.560

231.318

0.119
0.940
0.697
0.065
0.642
0.216
0.092
0.471
0.512
0.552
0.458
0.001
0.007
0.003

.

.

***
**
**

0.149
0.974
0.733
0.084
0.658
0.201
0.116
0.511
0.511
0.553
0.438
0.001
0.005
0.017

231.641

.

***
**
*

231.220

Signif. codes: ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1
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0.166
0.965
0.722
0.073
0.659
0.234
0.133
0.505
0.514
0.579
0.483
0.001
0.005
0.016

.

***
**
*

232.493

0.181
0.939
0.692
0.086
0.647
0.273
0.147
0.469
0.548
0.589
0.518
0.001
0.006
0.047

.

***
**
*

